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I may add that I have found one or two cases where a preposition has been made exclusive in the English by the insertion of an unwarranted 'only,' and also of the reverse process by which a preposition which is emphatically exclusive in the French has lost its exclusive force in translation. For my own part, I should regard carelessness on so important a point as much more serious than the one or two slips or unidiomatic renderings to which I have referred. Taken all together, these minor blemishes detract little from an excellent piece of work. As is usually the case with Messrs. Macmillan's publications, the paper and type are exceedingly good.

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THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUALITY AND VALUE. The Gifford Lectures for 1911, delivered in Edinburgh University. By B. Bosanquet. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1912. Pp. xxxvii, 409.

A new book by Dr. Bosanquet, and especially a series of Gifford Lectures by him, is sure to be welcomed and eagerly read by all who are interested in philosophical discussion. Hence, in writing a review of it, it can hardly be necessary to give any detailed account of its contents,—especially as a very complete analysis of its argument is prefixed to it by the author. It may suffice to say that the present work is a restatement, with some modifications, of the general philosophical position of Mr. Bradley, set forth in a more positive form than that which was given to it by the latter in his "Appearance and Reality," and with more definite indications of the ways in which it may be used in dealing with some of the larger problems of life. This was certainly a work worth doing. Mr. Bradley's great book, fascinating as it is for every lover of profound speculation, has repelled or disappointed many readers by its dialectical form and by the apparently negative or vague character of its main results. The views set forth by him are apt to present themselves, at least to his more superficial or impatient readers, in the form of some such summary as this: (1) All reality is individual, (2) There is only one individual, (3) That one is not an individual; or (1) Reality is a self-consistent whole, (2) Only the Absolute is self-consistent, (3) The

Absolute cannot really be thought of in a self-consistent way. It may be said, I believe, to be the chief object of Dr. Bosanquet to make it clear that the line of argument pursued by Mr. Bradley does not really land us in any such impasse as this.

In carrying out this work, he makes large use of a conception that he has frequently employed in a very effective way on previous occasions,—*viz.*, that of the essential place of negativity in ultimate reality; or, in other words, that of the necessity of difference in any real identity or of multiplicity in any real unity. If this general principle is granted, it becomes evident that the Absolute cannot be thought of as pure self-identity, or as a simple positive reality standing in opposition to appearance. Rather it must be conceived as an eternal unity or order that involves differentiation in its intrinsic nature, and consequently shows itself in a multiplicity of appearances that have reality, though not a completely independent reality. The sin of the finite, if we may so express it, lies in setting itself up as a *res completa*. It can only save its life by losing it in the life of the whole. According to a view of this kind, the reality of the finite is not simply to be denied or treated as unessential. Everything is real in its own place, and is essential to the completeness of the whole; but its place can only be properly understood in relation to the universal order. Dr. Bosanquet's last lecture, in which he emphasizes the sense in which reality attaches to Nature, is particularly interesting as an exposition of this view; and ought surely, among other things, to make it once for all apparent that modern Idealism is by no means committed to subjectivity.

When this more positive aspect of Mr. Bradley's doctrine is held steadily in view throughout, it becomes apparent that it differs much less from that of Hegel or of Plato than is apt at first to be supposed; and Dr. Bosanquet constantly tends, in the course of his exposition, to treat all these views as being substantially identical. Perhaps he might, with advantage, have recognized more fully that this identity, like others, is an identity in difference; but his method of treatment has at least the advantage of helping to bring together what is best in the teaching of all these writers—and indeed of some others as well. It is hardly necessary to add that the views set forth are admirably illustrated by many concrete applications, and that the book is full of those happy *aperçus* which one has learned to look for

in the work of Dr. Bosanquet,—sometimes perhaps rather too studiously hidden away in parentheses or foot-notes, but easily enough discoverable by the careful reader. It would be difficult to point to any book in which the mature results of philosophic thought on the great issues of life are so carefully and fully set forth. Readers would, however, find it very profitable to compare it with the new Gifford Lectures by Dr. James Ward, which have almost simultaneously appeared. The two works seem to me to be, to a considerable extent, mutually corrective. The second series of Dr. Bosanquet's lectures, which is now in preparation, may be expected to be even more interesting and important than the first, at least from the point of view of Ethics.

If any defect is to be noted in a work of such high quality and great suggestiveness, it is perhaps to be found in a certain hesitancy which sometimes prevents the main principles from being thoroughly driven home. If the element of negativity or difference is to be taken quite seriously, it seems to involve the reality of process. If there is, in Dr. Bosanquet's phrase, a dissociation of the Absolute, it would appear that we must think also of a process by which its unity is recovered. If so, the reality of time as the general form of any such process ought surely to be more definitely recognized. The conception of a downward and an upward path, which Plato seems to have learned from Heracleitus, may have to be rather more explicitly reintroduced into modern philosophy,—a revised version of 'Paradise Lost' and 'Paradise Regained.' The Absolute, it would appear, has to be thought of as itself 'dying to live,' breaking itself up in order that it may achieve a more perfect wholeness. Some such view seems to be hinted at by Dr. Bosanquet; and it may be that in the second series of his lectures we shall find this suggestion more fully carried out. In the meantime it does not appear to have been thoroughly adopted; and there is, in consequence, a certain vacillation in the treatment of some fundamental problems. The reality of the finite is sometimes too grudgingly acknowledged, while at other times it is recognized in too unqualified a way. What I mean by this can only be very briefly indicated here.

If it is to be seriously maintained that there is a real dissociation of the Absolute, and that it lives in its appearances (as Mr. Bradley himself affirms), it can hardly be right to ascribe to these appearances only a 'degree' of reality. We may rightly

speak of degrees of adequacy in our apprehension of their reality; but that which is apprehended must, it would seem, be recognized as an absolutely real aspect of the universe. This is, in many places, acknowledged by Dr. Bosanquet. Thus he says (p. 27): "We can have no doubt that there is time in the Absolute. It is a further question whether, and if at all, in what sense, the Absolute is in time." And again: "There cannot be spirit, it would seem, constituted by nothing but pure spiritual centers. Spirit is a light, a focus, a significance, which can only be by contact with a 'nature,' an external world" (p. 240). If this is true, surely some qualification is needed in such statements as "I do not doubt that anything which can ultimately *be*, must be of the nature of mind or experience" (p. 135), and "The great enemy of all sane idealism is the notion that the ideal belongs to the future."¹ It seems to me that the reality of that which is the 'other' of mind, and the reality of the 'upward path' in human life, should be more fully recognized.

But if such a criticism as this may be fairly urged, it is perhaps still truer to say that a certain tendency to overemphasize nature as against the finite consciousness is frequently apparent. One is sometimes tempted to urge against Dr. Bosanquet a somewhat similar objection to that which Plato brought against Anaxagoras. He takes mind as his final principle of order, but in detail seems anxious to appeal to anything rather than mind for explanation. Thus, in dealing with the relations between body and mind, he appears to come very near to the affirmation of epiphenomenalism; and, in spite of the careful way in which his position is explained and qualified, I can hardly think that it is fully justified. He says, for instance, taking the example of a pin-prick (p. 198): "Sensation and pain, it is submitted, are what the prick is when the apprehension of it is deepened; they are no additional reaction, but the reaction as apprehended by a certain kind of system. They are what the effect on the sentient organism is like when you come to realize it." An interpretation, he says further, "is not a new happening; it is an appreciation of what is happening." But surely the deepening of an apprehension, the coming to realize what happens, the interpretation or appreciation of what happens, are all happen-

¹ If he said 'belongs *only* to the future,' I should of course not object.

ings. To read a poem is a happening; to understand it is a happening; to appreciate or criticise it is a happening. Can it be otherwise with a pin-prick? To be aware of its contact is a happening; to apprehend the painfulness of it is a happening; to dislike this painfulness is a happening. These conscious events are no doubt happenings of a different kind from the motion of the pin or the nervous shock; but surely they are no less real. They are something additional that occurs, though they are not spatial movements; and it would seem to be necessary to give them a place in any causal order that we may be led to recognize. Similarly, the familiar saying that 'the statue is found lying in the marble' seems to be taken rather too literally (p. 165). What the saying points to is partly, I should say, a certain *lack* of plasticity in the material. A worker in such material is to some extent *limited* by it.

Dr. Bosanquet is, I think, on firmer ground when he urges (p. 191) that "in apparent cosmic development, whether inorganic, organic, or logical, the rule is for the stream to rise higher than its source"; but this suggests a very different doctrine, and one that does not appear to me to be worked out with sufficient definiteness in this book. There is ample evidence throughout the work that the author has made a profound study of the writings of M. Bergson; but I doubt whether he has done full justice to the conception of 'creative evolution,' which that writer has done so much to popularize. He seems, on the whole, to seek to minimize the importance of the forward movement; and in this I doubt whether he is quite faithful to what is best in the teaching of Hegel, and indeed in that of Plato and Aristotle also,—the writers to whom, next to Mr. Bradley, he most commonly appeals. It is possible, however, that this aspect of the truth will be more fully brought out in the second series of his lectures. In the present series he is anxious to guard against misinterpretations of the idea of development. Certainly, to speak of an *élan vital* is not very enlightening; but I could have wished to see a more definite recognition of a forward movement leading to an intelligible end,—a more definite effort to interpret the world by means of the Form of Good.

I have thought it worth while, in an ethical Journal, to call attention to these apparent defects, because the reality of progress seems to be fundamentally important for Ethics. I am, however, very well aware that Dr. Bosanquet does not really

mean to deny this. I only suggest that he has not always made his view sufficiently clear. In any case, if there are such blemishes as I have indicated in his work, they are only spots on the sun. His book, on the whole, is a great treasure-house of ripe wisdom.

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THE MESSAGES OF THE POETS. (Vol. VII of *The Messages of the Bible*, edited by F. K. Sanders and C. F. Kent.) By Nathaniel Schmidt, M.A. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1911. Pp. xxiv, 415.

Both the religious significance and the artistic value of the old Hebrew poetry have been to a great extent obscured by an unhappy method of exegesis based on a false theory of inspiration. What is needed in order that these writings may come into their full rights is the employment of strictly scientific principles in their interpretation, and this is what Professor Schmidt has done in the present volume. After a description of the motifs of Old Testament poetry and its form (rhythm, metre, parallelism, strophic structure) and a notice of the poets (David is the only one of them who is known by name), he discusses the ethical and religious value of the poems, and then takes up, one by one, the books and fragments that have been preserved, giving his own translations and adding expositions. In the numerous cases in which the Hebrew text calls for emendation his conclusions will, for the most part, commend themselves to scholars, and his expositions are independent and fresh, and are marked by critical insight and constructive ability. He has rich material of literary illustration and comparison, and the dates he assigns to the various pieces are in accordance with the most advanced Old Testament criticism of to-day. In order, he says, to give the impression of poetry, conveying not only the thought but something of the form of the original, his translations are in metre (generally in iambic unrhymed quatrains). There are obvious advantages in this method—the text may gain poetic flavor and the thought becomes more real to the English reader. The metrical versions are very well done—the choice of words is excellent (the predominance of words of one syllable is noteworthy) and the tone of the original is clearly rendered. On the other hand, the employment of metre